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Mispriced and misadministered deposit insurance imparts risk-shifting incentives to U.S.
banks. Regulators are expected to monitor and discipline increases in bank risk exposure that would
transfer wealth from the FDIC to bank stockholders. This paper assesses the success regulators had
in controlling risk-shifting by U.S. banks during 1985-1994. In contrast to single-equation estimates
developed from the option model by others, our simultaneous-equation evidence indicates that
regulators failed to prevent large U.S, banks from shifting risk to the FDIC. Moreover, at the
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Until a risk-related premium structure was introduced in the 1990s, the flat explicit
deposit insurance premium paid by U.S. banks created an incentive for insured banks to
increase their risk exposurel. Viewing the bank’s deposit guarantee as a put option written
by the FDIC, Merton (1977) shows that the value of this option to the bank would
increase with asset risk and leverage risk. Higher risk increases the value of the FDIC’s
insurance services. If the incremental cost a bank pays for these services does not rise to
absorb this value, increasing risk exposure extracts an incremental deposit insurance
subsidy. Such subsidies may benefit bank stockholders via higher stock price artd/or they
may be “shifted”, in whole or large part, to bank customers,
Four forces act to restrain excessive risk taking by the banks. Benston, Eisenbeis,
Horvitz, Kane, and Kaufman (1986) argue that market discipline from uninsured
debtholders and other stakeholders limit risk-taking excesses. They also mention a
second limiting factor: managerial risk-aversion. To avoid the negative effect that
leading a bank to failure may have on their reputational human capital, managers may
limit risk-taking to reduce probability of distress. Saunders et al. (1990) develop
evidence that supports this hypothesis. Third, though cushioned by deposit insurance,
distress costs help to restrain risk-taking. Substantial charter value may be lost in the
l We thank Alan Marcus and James T. Moser for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper.
1See, for example, Buser et al. (1981), Goodman and Santomero (1986), and Kane (1986, 1987).
1event of liquidation. The last but not least important restraining factor is government
regulation.
Buser et al. (1981) model the price of federal deposit insurance as a sum of two
components: an explicit insurance premium and an implicit cost associated with
regulatory pressure for safe and sound operation, The implicit premium is conceived to
be risk-sensitive so as to stop excessive risk-taking by the banks. In a bilaterally market-
driven equilibrium, the marginal benefits from deposit insurance would be exactly offset
by its marginal costs (explicit and implicit). However, deposit insurance is a trilateral
contract. Agency problems in government decision-making process raise the possibility
of an equilibrium in which an uncompensated risk exposure is shifted to taxpayers.
Gorton and Rosen (1995) opine that, despite general agreement among researchers on
bank incentives, “empirical research has not reached a consensus on whether deposit
insurance is underpriced.” Marcus and Shaked (1984) adapt a one-year put option
model to estimate the risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums. Their results suggest
that the FDIC insurance is generally overpriced, although the distribution of “fair”
premiums is highly skewed. Ronn and Verma (1986) refine the Marcus-Shaked model
and incorporate market perceptions of FDIC forbearance policies. Duan, Moreau, and
Sealey (1992) use the methods of Ronn and Verma (1986) to estimate fair FDIC
premiums. Linking changes in these premiums to the changes in banks’ risk exposure,
they estimate that successful risk-shifting is a relatively isolated phenomenon.
These studies presume a one-year option settlement framework, which understates the
value of deposit insurance. Pennacchi (1987) clarifies that an implicit and counterfactual
2See Buser et al. (1981) and Marcus (1984).
3See, for example, Buser et al (1981), Flannery (1982), and Pyle (1984, 1986).
2assumption in one-year models is that, at each settlement date, insurance premia are
adjusted to fair value and/or the FDIC forces banks to raise their capital ratios to a fair
level. Studies by Allen and Saunders (1993) and Cooperstein, Pennacchi, and Redburn
(1995) propose more realistic multiperiod deposit insurance valuation methods.
Even maintaining the counterfactual assumption of prompt option settlement, we
develop strong evidence of active risk-shifting. We use the model of Duan, Moreau, and
Sealey (1992) to tie the incremental insurance subsidy received by a bank to changes in





Our sample is substantially larger and is more representative of the population of U.S.
banks than the samples studied in prior work.
We explore differences in risk shifting between healthy and troubled institutions.
There is no reason to expect a uniform risk-shifting pattern across our sample.
Corporate finance theory implies that risk-shifting incentives are strongest for
troubled institutions. The very large banks studied in the previous literature include
some of the safest in U.S.
We use an improved estimator that recognizes and adjusts for simultaneity bias built
by definition into single-equation structural models of bank leverage and risk-adjusted
insurance premia.
Our estimates indicate that risk-restraining forces are far weaker than earlier studies
suggest. The policy implication of our evidence is that ailing institutions seek more
actively to shift risks than other banks do and that in 1985-1994 the regulatory system
failed to contain risk-shifting by these banks.
3The paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the one-period option pricing
model for risk-adjusting deposit insurance. Our sample, methods and results are
described in section II. Section III examines the robustness of our findings. Section lV
sums up the paper.
1. The Model
Ronn and Verma (1986) model the fair premium for deposit insurance services (P) as
the value of a limited-term (one year) put option:
(l-a)nv~, ~(y, ) ,
IP=B, N(y~)– ~ (1)
where B1 is the face value of insured deposits, B is the face value of insured and
uninsured debt, V is the
the number of times per
follows:
value of bank assets, 5 is the dividend per dollar of assets, n is






where Ov is the instantaneous standard deviation of asset returns, N(0) is the cumulative
standard normal distribution, T is the effective maturity (one year).
It is convenient to estimate IPP, the insurance premium per dollar of insured deposits:
ZPP=ZP/B, =~(yz)– (l–d)n; ~(yl). (2)
4
4Neither the market value of bank assets, V, nor the standard deviation of asset returns, Ov,
is observable. They can, however, be estimated using two additional equations. The
first equation states the call option valuation assignable to the equity of a levered firm:
E = VN(X, )–pBN(x2) , (3)
where E is the value of the bank’s equity, p is the exercise price, as a percentage of the
value of deposits.





We follow Ronn and Verrna (1986) in modeling FDIC forbearance policy as lowering the
exercise price of the shareholders’ call option below the value of bank deposits by setting
p = 0.97. This procedure neglects the option value of further FDIC forbearance when the
p threshold is crossed (Kane (1986)).
The second equation states a relationship between Ov and ~E that follows from Ito’s
lemma:
~_ogl
V—E v N(x, ) “
(4)
Here, ~E is the instantaneous standard deviation of equity returns.
Comparative-static analysis of equation (2) implies that a manager can increase the
value of the deposit insurance subsidy by increasing asset risk Ov and/or leverage B/V.
4Equations (3) and (4) are solved simultaneously for V and ov using Microsoft Excell 5.0 software.
5Duan et al. (1992) translate this implication into two testable hypotheses by
approximating the change in the per-dollar insurance premium as follows:










A positive ~1would indicate that the bank was successful in increasing its deposit
insurance subsidy through risk-shifting during the sample period,
that -- absent market and government disciplinary responses --
Merton (1977) shows
the partial derivatives
dIPPhov and dIPP&(B/V) are positive.
other risk-restraining factors introduce
Empirically, risk-sensitive capital
negative linkages between ov and
regulation and
B/V (negative
u1). The net effect of how disciplinary restraints modify risk-shifting incentives can be
assessed by estimating al and ~1. The two hypotheses about the character of net risk-
shifting are:
Hypothesis 1: al 20,
Hypothesis 2: ~1 <0,
Treating crv as exogenous (a restriction we relax in section III), one can test Hypotheses 1
and 2 for an individual bank j by estimating the following equations:
6Bjl
—= aoj +a,jov. +Sj[.
Vjl ,1 (9)
IPPj[ = Bl)j + Plj”Vj, +gjt. (lo)
Rejecting Hypothesis 1 would affirm that risk-restraining factors outweigh risk-shifting
incentives. Rejecting Hypothesis 2 would indicate that risk-shifting incentives prevail.
Partial derivatives of IPP
these variables. There is no
with respect to Ov and B/V are complicated functions of




the majority of banks operate safely and do not actively shift risks,
shifting intensify with financial distress. Marcus (1984) shows that
prefer a safer policy to protect their charter, while financially weaker
banks may reap advantages from strategic risk-taking. Marcus and Shaked (1984) find
the distribution of bank risk-shifting to be skewed: almost the entire estimated value of
the aggregate deposit insurance subsidy flows to the riskiest 5 percent of insured banks.
The hypothesis that it may pay a bank to shift risks aggressively when it is in distress
implies that positive al and ~1should emerge more frequently at distressed institutions.
To test for risk-shifting by distressed institutions, we reestimated equations (9) and
(10) on pooled data introducing interactive dummy variables for financial distress:
B.




In these equations, d = 1 if the bank was undercapitalized in the preceding quarter and
d=O otherwise. We augment the analysis with the following two null hypotheses that we
expect to reject:
7Hypothesis 3: al 1S O
Hypothesis 4: ~11<0
Rejecting these two hypotheses would indicate that undercapitalized banks are able to
expand their access to deposit insurance subsidy.
Il. Methods and Results
A. Sample Selection and Data
The models derived in the previous section are estimated with quarterly data running
from the first quarter of 1985 through the fourth quarter of 1994. Our analysis focuses on
chartered commercial banks (SIC codes 6021 and 6022) whose shares trade on NYSE,
AMEX, or NASDAQ.
consecutive quarters
To be included into our sample, a bank must have at least sixteen
of balance-sheet and stock-returns data available from,
correspondingly, Compustat Industrial Quarterly and CRSP daily returns files. Such a
restriction is necessary to allow estimation of regressions for each individual bank. These
screening criteria are satisfied for 124 banks, offering us a total of 4,227 bank-quarter
observations. Survivorship bias may be introduced if our selection criteria eliminate
some banks whose particularly intense risk-shifting incentives resulted in early failure.
This bias makes our assessment of risk-shifting by troubled banks conservative.
Table I presents the sample distribution by number of quarters of data available and
by chartering authority. A full forty quarters of data are available for eighty-three banks.
Data for the remaining forty-one bank cover sixteen to thirty-eight quarters. Forty-seven
banks are state-chartered; eighty-seven have a national charter.
8Table II reports the distribution of the sample by calendar years. Observations by
calendar year vary from a low of 338 in 1985 to a high of 492 in 1991, 1992, and 1993.
Table ~ presents summary statistics for the sample. The sample banks are diverse in
their financial characteristics. While the sample is clearly skewed toward larger
institutions, relatively small banks are represented better than in earlier studies. Bank
asset size varies from a mere $125 million to $251 billion. Other characteristics, such as
standard deviations of stock and asset returns, as well as the estimated values of fair
deposit insurance premiums are of similar magnitude to those in the samples analyzed by
Marcus and Shaked (1984), and Ronn and Verma (1986). The last line in the table shows
that while the majority of the sample shows very low values for risk-adjusted insurance
premiums (the median is 0.00370), a distinct minority receives extremely high IPP values.
This reinforces our concern that analyzing average risk-shifting for the sample is not
sufficient. It is important to look for groups of banks that actively pursue deposit
insurance subsidies.
B. Definition of Variables
Statistical proxies for conceptual variables are briefly discussed below:
B, total debt : calculated as a difference between book values of assets (Compustat
item 044) and common equity (Compustat item 059).
E, market value of bank’s equity ; calculated as the end-of-period stock price
(Compustat item 014) times number of shares outstanding (Compustat item 061).
9GE , standard deviation of the return on equi~ : estimated from daily stock returns
over the previous quarte?.
6, dividends per dollar of assets : calculated as the cash dividends per common share
(Compustat item 020) times number of shares outstanding (Compustat item 061)
divided over market value of bank’s assets (V).
C. Tests of Hypothesis 1
C.1. Linear Time-Series Estimates
To test Hypothesis 1, equation (9) is estimated separately for each of 124 banks. The
regressions include corrections for first-order autocorrelation in residuals. Results are
reported in the first column of Table IV, At the five percent significance level, 33
negative and no positive estimates of al emerge. At the ten percent level, nine more
coefficient estimates prove significantly negative, but only one significantly positive
coefficient develops. This evidence rejects Hypothesis 1 that the risk restraints are
negligible only for between one-quarter and one-third of the sample banks.
Duan et al. (1992) report that 28 of the 30 banks they examined for 1976-1986
exhibited a significantly negative al. This led them to claim that restraints on bank risk-
shifting dominate risk-taking incentives. In our expanded sample that covers a later time
period, risk-restraining factors prove much weaker. Twenty-one banks are present in both
samples. For 20 of these banks Duan et al. (1992) report significantly negative estimates
5We require at least 20 stock-return observations for a particular bank-quarter to be included into our
sample. The estimated standard deviation of stock returns is annualized assuming 253 trading days per
year.
10of al. At five percent, only 4 of these show negative coefficient estimates in our
1994 time period, and only two more negative coefficients emerge at ten percent.
C,2. Nonlinear Least-Squares Estimates
1985-
In regression (9), the left-hand side variable o“, is calculated from variables that include
the dependent variable BW. This implies that estimates of U1from model (9) are biased
by variable definitions. To clarify this, we note from (3) and (4) that:
B N(xz) —— ov=tsE-aEPv N(x, ). (13)
Therefore, (9) can be rewritten as
[ ~%1” ;=ao+a, aE l–p (14)
With B/V on both sides of equation (14) direct estimates of al suffer from a definitional
simultaneity bias. By construction, the endogenous variable B/V enters the regressor.
This renders the regressor stochastic and correlated with the error term &.
To remove this bias from estimates of al, equation (14) can be rearranged into a
reduced form by collecting B/V terms on the left-hand sideG:
B a. a,a E —= +(. (15)
V l+alo,pN(xz)/N(xl) + l+alO.PN(Xz)/ N(x, )
Column 2 of Table IV, presents estimates of al for each bank using the method of non-
linear least squares. The regressions include a correction for first-order autocorrelation in
residuals. Using five percent significance, across the 124 banks, equation (15) yields
bStrictly speaking, B/V still enters the right hand side of equation (15) through the term NON. As a
practical matter, however, NON remains virtually constant across the sample observations: 99% of all
sample values fall between 0.99 and 1. The mean value of the ratio is 0.9995, its standard deviation is
0.0031, and the correlation with BN is only -0.058.
11twelve positive and five negative estimates of al. Thirteen additional estimates become
significantly positive at the ten percent significance. Thus, using the more appropriate
nonlinear model (15), only about four percent of the sample banks behave as if they are
subject to strong risk-restraining factors. The policy implication is that risk-restricting
factors were largely neutralized during the 1985-1994 period.
For 38 banks, models (9) and (15) yield different results for the sign of al. The
probability of a discrepancy at least as large as this by pure chance7 is only 4.3x 10-1*. It
seems clear that, by not recognizing definitional simultaneity built into equation (9), one
is bound to overestimate the strength of risk-restraining factors.
C.3. Pooled Estimates
We next estimate equation (11) for a panel of all banks. To resolve the simultaneity
problem identified in the previous subsection, we employ lagged values of the
independent variable Ov as instruments. At the cost of introducing specification error,
this eliminates contemporaneous correlation between the regressor and the disturbance
vector and allows us to obtain a consistent estimator of U1.
We experimented with several specifications for the pooled regression. Likelihood-
ratio tests indicated the existence of both firm- and time-specific effects, while Hausman
tests supported the fixed-effects model against the random-effects model. Using the
fixed-effects model allows intercepts to vary across sample banks and periods while
holding slopes constant. Results are reported in Table V. The estimated al in this pooled
7Assuming that the probability of type I error is 5 percent and that these errors are independent, the
probability of having 38 type I errors is equal (0.05 )36X124!/[38 !x(124-38)!].
12regression proves significantly negative, indicating that, on balance across the sample,
risk-restraining factors are strong.
We test Hypothesis 3 that risk-restraining factors differ across banks by using
interactive dummy variables. We estimate al separately for two groups of banks: those
whose leverage in the preceding quarter lay below (d = O) and above (d = 1) the 90th
sample percentile. The results reject Hypothesis 3: the significantly negative coefficient
on the interactive variable for d = O contrasts with the positive coefficient when d = 1.
This finding indicates that restraining forces are weak for banks that become
undercapitalized. This implies that regulatory and market disciplines break down in the
very cases where they need to be strong.
D. Tests of Hypothesis 2
D.1. Time-Series Estimates
Table VI reports tests of Hypothesis 2 developed from estimates of equation (10) for
each bank in the sample. The regressions include a correction for first-order
autocorrelation in residuals. At five percent significance, five positive estimates of ~1
emerge and no negative ones. At ten percent, another estimate becomes significantly
positive and four negative ones emerge. This indicates that about five percent of sample
banks were able to expand deposit insurance subsidies through risk-shifting. Although
this percentage is small, the positive coefficients found in these time-series regressions
imply that particular banks shifted risk for a prolonged period of time: in fact throughout
most of the 4 to 10-year period for which data on these banks were observed.
D.2. Pooled Estimates
13Relationship (12) is estimated for a panel of all banks. Again, alternative
specifications are compared. Likelihood-ratio and Hausman tests suggest the presence of
bank- and time-specific intercepts. The slope is held constant across banks. Results are
presented in Panel A of Table VII. The estimated ~1 in this pooled regression differs
insignificantly from zero, suggesting that, on average, risk-restraining factors just offset
risk-shifting incentives.
To test Hypothesis 4 about how risk-restraining factors differ across banks, we use
interactive dummy variables to estimate ~1 separately for two groups of banks: those
whose leverage in the preceding quarter lay below (d = O) and above (d = 1) the 90th
sample percentile. The results reject Hypothesis 4 at the ten percent level: a significantly
positive beta emerges from the interactive variable when d = 1. This indicates that
regulatory discipline failed to prevent undercapitalized banks from increasing their
deposit insurance subsidy. For well-capitalized banks, the coefficient is insignificant.
Ill. Robustness of Results
In this section we examine the sensitivity of our findings to misspecification and other
statistical problems. Overall, our sensitivity tests support the hypothesis of risk-shifting
and indicate that risk-restraining factors in 1985-1994 were weak.
A. Simultaneity Bias and Errors-in-Variables
In principle, a bank’s leverage and the volatility of its asset returns are simultaneously
determined. Neglecting the simultaneity between these variables could bias inferences
about risk restraints. Bias could also exist because the unobservable explanatory variable
is inevitably measured with error.
14An imperfect way to deal with simultaneity bias and errors-in-variables problem is to
use instrumental-variable (IV) estimators. A candidate for an instrument must be
correlated with the true regressor, but contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error
term. A workable (but potentially unreliable) approach is to substitute the predetermined
(lagged) values for the imperfectly observed regressor. Because we correct for first-order
autocorrelation in residuals by quasi-differencing, we introduce the second lag of the
explanatory variable as our instrument.
We have already used IV estimation for the pooled regressions relating bank leverage
ratios to asset risk, c,. We now apply the same approach to the pooled regressions of
risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums. The results reported in Panel B of Table 7
strengthen our earlier conclusions: undercapitalized institutions successfully increase the
value of their deposit insurance guarantee, but well-capitalized institutions do not and
may indeed not want to.
The IV versions of time-series tests of hypotheses 1 and 2 portray risk-restraining
factors as even weaker than our more-restrictive tests did. At 5 percent, the relation
between leverage and asset risk proves significantly negative for only three banks. The
number rises only to 10 banks at ten percent. The relation between deposit insurance
premium, IPP, and asset risk is significantly positive for 12 banks (15 at ten percent).
Although a bank can change its risk exposure overnight, using predetermined values
requires us to look at relations between leverage and asset risk that are measured half a
year apart. These IV-model results support the hypothesis that regulatory controls on risk
shifting operate with substantial lags.
B. Ratio Speci..cation of the Model
15It is also desirable to investigate the effect of coefficient restraints that are built into
every ratio specification. The models we estimated earlier place implicit restrictions on
the coefficient estimates. For example, equation (9) for the regressand B/V is
mathematically equivalent to:
B=~OV+~lVOv +VE. (16)
An unrestricted version of equation (16) introduces two potentially nonzero terms (with
coefficients y. and y2):
~=yo+y,v+y~o”+y~vov+v. (17)
To test for the appropriateness of restricting y. = O and y2 = Oone may estimate equation
(17).
For 34 banks, the coefficient restrictions imposed by (9) are not supported by the data.
The number of banks with strong risk-restricting factors (y3<O) decreases from 33 in the
restricted single-equation regression (15) to on]y 12, The number of banks with a
positive relation between leverage and asset risk increases from none to seven.
Similarly, we estimate an unrestricted version of equation (10). The restrictions are
not supported for 21 banks. The number of risk-shifting banks increases from five to
nine. Again, these results strengthen our initial findi rigs.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
U.S. experience with state deposit-insurance systems (Calomiris, 1992) and corporate
finance theory hold that weaknesses in deposit insurance pricing and capital enforcement
encourage banks to extract deposit insurance subsidies by increasing their risk exposure.
To test this hypothesis, we decompose it into three parts.
16The first part looks to measure the strength of regulatory enforcement as an
intensifying risk-restraining factor. We remove definitional simultaneity built in the
model used by Duan et al. (1992) to eliminate a bias in previous single-equation estimates
of the tested parameters. In contrast to the biased procedure, our tests indicate that risk-
restraining factors are weak.
The second part of our tests investigates the frequency of risk shifting among sample
banks. Our results indicate that about five percent of the sampled banks succeeded in
increasing their deposit insurance subsidy consistently over observation periods of four to
ten years.
A third set of tests focuses on endogenous risk-shifting by banks in periods for which
benefits from increasing deposit insurance subsidy promise to be extremely high.
Consistent with finance theory, we affirm that risk-shifting behavior is concentrated at the
financially weakest banks.
An array of sensitivity tests establi~h the robustness of our principal finding: troubled
U.S. banks actively engaged in risk-shifting during 1985-1994 and the regulatory system
failed to restrain this behavior adequately.
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19Table I
Sample Distribution by Number of Quarters of Data Available
and by Chartering Authority.
Number of Quarters Number of banks
of data al1banks federally chartered state chartered
40 83 57 26
38 1 1 0
36 3 2 1
33 1 0 1
32 3 1 2
31 1 0 1
28 1 1 0
27 1 0 1
25 1 1 0
24 2 1 1
23 1 0 1
22 1 1 0
21 2 0 2
20 4 1 3
17 2 2 0
16 17 9 8
Number of banks 124 77 47
Number of observations 4,227 2,728 1,499
20Table II
Sample Distribution by Calendar Year.














Summary statistics for 124 sample banks over the period 1985-94. The statistics are calculated from
quarterly data. Leverage ratio is defined as (face value of total debt/ market value of assets),
Characteristic Mean Median Min Max
Market value of assets ($MM) 18,350 6,856 125 251,000
Total deposits ($MM) 17,448 6,344 120 242,700
Leverage ratio (%) 93.5 93.9 65.2 103.2
Annualized std. dev. of rate of 28.3 25.15 5.3 128.8
return on equity (%)
Annualized std. dev. of rate of 2.5 2.2 0.4 26.7
return on assets (%)
Risk-adjusted deposit insurance 0.101 0.003 0.000 4.882
premium per dollar of deposits,
IPP (%)
22Table IV
The Relation between Bank Leverage and Asset Risk: Time-Series Tests
Time series tests of Hypothesis 1: al 20. The al is the slope coefficient in the following structural model:
Bji/ Vj(= %j + ~(j~vjt + Ejt. (9)
where Bjl / Vjl is the leverage, ~vj( is the annualized standard deviation of asset returns for bank j in quarter
t.
The table below reports two estimates of al: a direct estimate from linear model (9) and an estimate from
the following reduced form nonlinear regression:
Bjt / Vjt = (%j + aljGEjL ) 1 [ 1 + ~lj~Ejl pN(xlj,) / N(xz,OI + Cjt (15)
where ~EJ,is the annualized stand~d deviation of equity returns for bank j in quarter t, p = 0.97, N(.) is the





Linear model Nonlinear model
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* significant at the 10 percent level using one-tailed test.
** significant at the 5 percent level using one-tailed test.
*** significant at tie 1 percent level using one-tailed test.
1each of these banks were part of the sample in Duan et al. (1992).
25Table V
The Relation between Bank Leverage and Asset Risk:
Pooled Time-Series-Cross-Sectional Tests
Pooled regression tests of Hypotheses 1 and 3 using the fixed-effects model with bank- and time-specific
intercepts. avjt.z is used as the instrumental variable for ~vjt.
Hypothesis 1: al >0. The al is the slope coefficient in the following regression:
BjL/ Vjl = %j + aljavjt + &jt. (9)
where Bjt / V,t is the leverage, ovjt is the annualized standard deviation of asset returns for bank j in quarter
t.
Hypothesis 3: al 1s O. The UI1is the first slope coefficient in the following regression:
where d = 1 for undercapitalized institutions and Ootherwise.
a] t-stat. a] 1 t-stat. alo t-stat.
Without dummies -0.693*** -23.43
With dummies 0.285*** 3.82 -0.749 *** -23.49
*** significant at the lpercent level using one-tailed test.
26Table VI
The Relation between Fair Deposit Insurance Premium and Asset Risk:
Time-Series Tests
Time series tests of Hypothesis 2: ~1 <O. The ~1 is the slope coefficient in the following regression:
IPPjt = ~oj+ pljavjt + gjt . (lo)
where IPPj( is the risk-adjusted insurance premium per dollar of insured deposits, ~vjl is the annualized
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FIRST BANK SYSTEM INC
FIRST CHICAGO CORP
FIRST COMMERCE CORP





FIRST TENNESSEE NATL CORP
FIRST UNION CORP (N C)












































































































REPUBLIC NEW YORK CORP





































































































































~ON BANK SAN FRANCISCO




FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP INC
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* significant at the 10 percent level using one-tailed test.
** significant at the 5 percent level using one-tailed test.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level using one-tailed test.
29Table VII
The Relation between Fair Deposit Insurance Premium and Asset Risk:
Pooled Time-Series-Cross-Sectional Tests
Hypothesis 2: ~1 20. The ~1 is the slope coefficient in the following regression:
IPPjl = ~Oji+ ~tavjl + &jt , (lo)
where IPPj( is the risk-adjusted insurance premium per dollar of insured deposits, ~vjt is the annualized
standard deviation of asset returns for bank j in quarter t.
Hypothesis 4: ~1*SO. The ~1’ is the first slope coefficient in the following regression:
IPPjt = ~ojt+ ~l]d~vj~ + ~l”(l-d)ovj, + <jl , (12)
where d = 1 for undercapitalized institutions and Ootherwise.
Panel A: Pooled regression tests of Hypotheses 2 and 4 using the fixed-effects model with bank- and time-
specific intercepts.
PI t-stat. P1’ t-stat. P1° t-stat.
Without dummies 0.004 0.86
With dummies 0.019* 1.78 0.006 1.19
Panel B: Instrumental-variable estimation: pooled regression tests of Hypotheses 2 and 4 with bank-
and time-specific random effects. av,t.2 is used as the instrumental variable for ~vjt.
PI t-stat. P1l t-stat. Pl” t-stat.
Without dummies 0.004 1.05
With dummies 0.027*** 2.68 0.003 0.66
* significant at the 10 percent level using One-tailed test.
** significant at the 5 percent level using one-tailed test.
*** significant at the 1 percent level using one-tailed test
30